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I would like to preface my detailed remarks on Ms. 
Liszt's paper by stating that, overall, I agree with her 
conclusion that the liberation of animals is a valid 
response to the structural violence currently perpetrated 
on animals. If we take seriously the rights of animals, 
and if we confront frankly what is done to animals in 
factory farms, fur farms, and laboratories of the United 
States and throughout the world, there can be no 
question but that the injustice is grave and requires 
redress. The analogies which Liszt makes to the 
condition of slaves in the U.S. and to the Nazi Holocaust 
are quite apt. Those who recognize the violence done 
are called upon to take measures to redress the injustice, 
and since this injustice is institutionalized and legally 
sanctioned, we are justified in challenging and in 
transgressing these unjust laws. 
I agree with Liszt on this fundamental point, and I 
think it is very important that we clearly articulate the 
notion ofstructural violence and the moral groundsfor 
responding to it. Those who would challenge the 
legitimacy of the animal rights movement are only too 
eager to brand the actions of animal liberators as 
violent. terrorist acts. It is exJremely important that 
the groundsfor the liberation ofanimals be made clear 
and that acts ofliberation be understoodfor what they 
are: responses to structural violence. I think that this 
isLiszt's aim in her paper and that she has offered some 
important clarifications. Nevertheless, I disagree with 
her in many points of detail. 
I. Structural Violence 
What is structural violence? Liszt develops a notion 
based upon lohan Galtung. He says that "we are in the 
presence of violence when we are influenced in a way 
which causes our actual physical and mental condition 
to lag behind the potential." Liszt goes on to claim that 
in structural violence, the act/act/victim relationship 
is broken: "There is now only act/victim, only action 
and that which is acted upon." She gives as an example 
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the starvation of Ethiopians today, and asks as to who 
is the perpetrator of this hunger. She answers that 
there is no perpetrator, that it is a "clear case of structural 
violence." 
While I understand that Liszt means to say that 
there is no one perpetrator, it seems to me wrong to deny 
that in cases ofstructural violence there are perpetrators. 
In fact, the very examples she uses to illustrate slructural 
violence belie this claim. To have died of hunger a 
hundred years ago in Ethiopia, before it was possible 
to prevent such death, cannot be considered to have 
been death by structural violence, as Liszt points out. 
But because today we well-fed Europeans and 
Americans know what is happening there and why, and 
because there is enough to eat in the world, today such 
starvation is structural violence. 
Thus, it is precisely the presence of individuals 
who participate in exploitive economic and political 
systems, and who can reasonably be expected to know 
about its exploitive consequences, and to act to prevent 
them, which make today's starvation a case of slructural 
violence. No one person, but all the individuals 
involved are responsible, and to varying degrees. What 
we should say is that in the case of structural violence 
the perpetrators are often hidden from view. Liszt is 
quite right in saying that the actors in slructural violence 
may intend no harm. As she points out, when looking 
at structural violence it is not the subjective intention 
but, rather, the objective consequence which is of 
primary interest But the fact that the individuals who 
promote violence through their participation in 
exploitive structures do not intend to cause hann is no 
reason to deny their authorship of and their 
responsibility for violent deeds. 
Why does it matter what we say here? Liszt 
concludes that "It is clear, then, that the perpetrator of 
structural violence is not to be sought. The structures, 
the System...must be changed." I would certainly agree 
that exploitive systems must be changed, but in letting 
the individuals who profit from and perpetuate 
exploitive systems off the hook, she blocks one 
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important, perhaps crucial, avenue for structural change. 
We must call the perpetrators of structmal violence to 
account, demanding that they take responsibility for 
what they do, whether they intended it or not. As Liszt 
points out, "Laws which are drawn up to prevent 
personal or intended violence fail when faced with 
structural or unintended violence." The solution, here, 
is to draw up laws which call individuals to account 
for their participation in violence, whether they 
intend itor not. For example, the chief executive officer 
of Exxon did not intend to cause the Valdez oil spill. 
But through his actions and his omissions (for example, 
through his resistance to safeguards) he shares a great 
deal ofresponsibility in having caused an environmental 
disaster. By letting him and his corporation off the 
hook so easily, we make violent structures profitable. 
If the corporate assets of Exxon had been seized and 
used entirely to heal the damage in Prince William 
Sound. and if the entire Board of Directors of Exxon 
were now sitting in jail, this would not solve the 
problem of the structural violence of the petroleum 
industry. But it certainly would provide a very real 
incentive for change. 
In discussing the killing of a healthy baboon in a 
laboratory experiment, Liszt says that "The agent 
which transported the violence is the structure of 
science itself." But this is only partially right, for 
without individual willing experimenters no baboons 
can be killed. Liszt points out that at the Nuremberg 
trials, individuals were held to account for their 
participation in the Hollocaust, even though that 
participation was legitimized and even demanded by 
the Third Reich. In order to hold individuals 
responsible, they must be identified as the particular 
agents of structural violence. 
I think that even many of the things that Liszt says 
elsewhere in her paper point toward the need for 
recognition and accountability for the perpetrators of 
structural violence, and I would encourage her to 
develop a modified defmition of structural violence. 
Such a definition must include at least the following 
elements: (1) Structural violence is violence which is 
legitimized through social or political or economic 
institutions and laws. (2) Structural violence is 
exploitive in that individuals benefit from the 
institutions at the expense of those whoare the recipients 
of the violence. (3) Structural violence need not be 
intentional, and those who participate in it need not be 
aware of their role as exploiters. 
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D. Defending the Liberation of Animals 
In defending animal liberation as a valid response 
to structural violence, Liszt argues that such actions are 
valid if they meet three criteria: legitimacy, necessity, 
and aptness. I will accordingly address her arguments 
for each of these three claims, as well as considering 
whether such acts must meet all three criteria in order 
to be "valid" responses. 
But first, I think it is important to clarify somewhat 
what is meant by the 'liberation of animals." It might 
seem obvious that this simply means the taking of 
animals from factory fanns or laboratories in violation 
of the law-Le., the "stealing" of such animals and 
placing them in safe havens. Liszt does not define 
liberation, but I assume that this is what she means. 
However, animal liberation also often includes other 
sorts of acts, such as the destruction or removal of 
property-some of it necessary in order to remove the 
animals (such as the breaking oflocks or the dismantling 
of security systems) and some of it unnecessary to this 
goal. I think it is important to keep in mind this 
distinction, for the arguments which support the 
legitimacy or aptness of removing animals do not, I 
think,justify destruction and removal of property, and 
these acts ought to be treated as a separate sort of case. 
I will have more to say about these acts below. 
1. Legitimacy 
I am not entirely sure what some of Liszt's 
terminology means. For example, I am not sure what 
the word "valid" means in her claim that animal 
liberation is a valid response. I have a similar problem 
with "legitimate," which I am reading as "moral" or at 
least as "not immoral.." Under this interpretation, it 
seems to me that Liszt's argument here is precisely 
correct. If we assume that the fundamental rights of 
animals are being violated in institutions such as factory 
farms or laboratories, and if we assume that moral 
duty is stronger than legal duty, then we are on strong 
moral ground in violating the law to rescue these 
animals. As Liszt points out, the Nuremberg trials 
provide a clear legal precedent, in holding individuals 
accountable to the higher moral principle and punishing 
them for their obedience to immoral laws. 
However, there is a possible second reading of 
Liszt's claim, and that is that animal liberation is in 
some sense legal. Her use ofNuremberg trials and her 
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discussion of legal precedent for holding individuals to 
unwritten laws suggests this. Here I wouid have to 
disagree. The reason that the Nazis can be held legally 
responsible for their crimes has something to do with 
the fact that they were violating a quite universally held 
principle against the killing of innocent human beings. 
Unfortunately, there is not at this point such a 
universally held principle applying to animals other 
than Homo sapiens. 
2. Necessity 
While I agree that animal liberation is legitimate in 
the sense of being moral, I do not find her argument 
that it is necessary convincing. Liszt uses Thoreau's 
argument that where a law is immoral we do not 
necessarily have a duty to devote all of our energy to 
eliminating it, but we must at least "wash our hands" 
of it Thus, ifour taxes are used to perpetrate injustice, 
we are complicit in this injustice, and we must act in 
order to remove "the burden of complicity," 
While I entirely agree that we are obligated to 
remove ourselves from complicity in unjust acts, and 
to violate laws which force this complicity, I fail to see 
how this shows the necessity of animal liberation. 
Liszt says that the act of liberation removes this burden 
by removing the possibility of injustice. But removing 
some particular animals from a laboratory does not 
remove my fmancial complicity in regard to millions 
of other laboratory animals. Thus, oddly, it seems not 
to be enough. Simply refusing to pay a portion, or all, 
ofone's taxes would seem to be a more straightforward 
way of removing complicity, together with abstention 
from any other sttuctures which in any way promote 
animal research, such as purchase ofproducts developed 
through animal research or tested on animals. 
The problem is that there are many particular 
actions which I might take to rescue individuals from 
unjust exploitation, none of which in any clear sense 
cancels my complicity in structural violence, assuming 
that I still do pay my taxes or in some other way 
indirectly support structural violence. If I rescue 
animals who are about to be killed because no one 
wants them, such as dogs, cats, battery chickens, and 
old farm animals, and I do this without violating any 
laws, am I still required to liberate some animals in 
violation of the law? If, in addition, I work to change 
the laws through legal means, but I continue to pay my 
taxes in order to avoid jail, does this somehow cancel 
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my complicity? I think that it is not at all clear that this 
is the case. 
While I am not convinced by Liszt's argument for 
the general necessity for animal liberation, I think that 
in specific cases acts of liberation can be shown to be 
necessary. Where we find ourselves obligated to 
specific individuals and where all legal means for help 
have been exhausted. we may be obligated to liberate 
an animal rather than standing by while that animal is 
harmed or killed. If my dog winds up in a research 
laboratory-even if the lab obtained her by legal 
means-I have an obligation to rescue her by whatever 
means I can, for I am her guardian. But I cannot have 
such obligations to all animals, for the simple reason 
that ought implies can, and it is not possible for me to 
rescue them all. 
While I do not think that animal liberation can 
generally be shown to be necessary, I do not think that 
this is a very telling point. It may be that animal 
liberation, while not a moral necessity, is supererog­
atory. Itcertainlydoes notdetract from acts ofheroism, 
such as rescuing someone from a burning building, 
that such actions are not morally obligatory. In fact, 
while I cannot in this context defend the claim, I would 
suggest that acts of animal liberation may well fall into 
this category. 
3. Aptness 
Liszt argues that to determine whether an act is apt, 
"one must make a judgment about both its efficacy in 
remedying an injustice, and whether the means are 
commensurate. To do that we must look at what the 
liberator is up against" Liszt argues that what we are 
up against is a massive System consisting of many 
structures, such as the Department of Education, the 
Post Office, the Military, and the FDA. All such 
structures, according to Liszt, have an unusual power 
to resist change. This is because such structures share 
a number ofcharacteristics, such as being conservative, 
autonomous, ponderous and insensitive to external 
impulse, having no methods of self-reflection, being 
compartmentalized and multifunctional, and serving 
as symbolic wish fulfillment. Given all of these 
characteristics, it becomes evident that such structures 
are "solid, securely in place, supported by habit, 
tradition, money, faulty logic and irrational impulses. 
They will not yield easily or soon to pressure for 
reform. II Liszt concludes from this that "The liberation 
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of animals can be seen to be the single most effective 
and least destructive method of preventing injustice to 
a specific animal at risk of injury or death... 
It seems to me that the question of how to address 
the systems Liszt has described, if we grant for a 
moment her description of their characteristics, is a 
vastly complex and difficult one. It in no way follows 
from the description of these structures that liberating 
animals will be particularly effective. It was not the 
underground railroad that ended slavery, after all. It 
took a civil war to do that. It could easily happen that 
the individuals who are devoted to defending these 
structures will use the liberation of animals as a weapon 
to portray the animal rights movement as a pack of 
terrorist criminals. In fact, the AMA has currently 
launched a national smear campaign designed to do 
just that. It could be that a far more effective tactic 
against such structures would be open acts of civil 
disobedience in which massive amounts of people are 
jailed. After all, those who liberate animals seek to 
break the law, and they also seek to get away with it, 
which in the eyes of many makes them more like 
terrorists than heroic revolutionaries. Animal liberation 
as a political tactic puts the animal rights movement 
in a precarious position. We have already seen efforts. 
such as the Fran Trott case, to link the movement with 
violence. Most recently, the shooting of the Dean of a 
southeastern veterinary school was linked in the news 
media to animal rights activists. The allegations had 
no grounds. but a little of this sort of thing can go a 
long way and do a great deal of damage in the press. 
In saying all this I am not trying to claim that animal 
liberation is ineffective or inappropriate but to point 
out that this question is much more difficult to answer 
than Liszt makes it out to be. I also would disagree 
with her description of the characteristics of the 
structures. Not all social structures need have the 
charactistics she describes, and the question is. how to 
create structures which do not. I particularly object to 
her characterization of science. Like most scientists, 
the physicist she quotes. von Weisacker. is no particular 
authority on the overall nature of science or scientific 
method, and most philosophers of science. myself 
included, would take strong exception to what he says, 
to the extent that it is clear. For example, what is the 
force of the claim, "The great scientific discoveries are 
miracles of holistic thinking"? Does this imply that 
scientists should give up experimentation for holistic 
thinking? No one would object to the claim that science 
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is not the absolute truth-no one since Descsrtes has 
proposed that it should be. 
It seems to me important not to charactierize social 
or political structures such as science as inherently 
violent and menacing. The real question is how to 
change such structures so that they are nonviolent and 
not exploitive. 
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My newly-born, 
we will share the wannth 
of the moon at night. 
I sing to you 
of ocean's fragile beauty. 
A dark green heaven, 
alive with color and movement. 
I pray you live long, 
and sing your children 
the ancestors' songs. 
You will have the strength of a giant; 
and the gentleness of a breeze. 
It is too soon to tell you 
of a creature called man. 
A few hear our music; 
fewer still understand the song. 
In your lifetime, 
perhaps man will seek 
our brotherhood. 
Kathleen Malley 
Between the Species 
